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Executive Summary
- The fall of the Assad regime triggered a marked expansion in civic space in Syria. Associations are registering with fewer obstacles, public gatherings have returned, and criticism of officials circulates more freely. Debate is part of daily life again, and people can question authority without the fear that once defined public behavior. Although the legal basis for these changes is still incomplete, the change represents a clear shift from decades of tight control and has enabled civic activity on a scale not seen in years.
- Yet progress is uneven and fragile. Access to information remains limited, participation in public affairs varies widely, and political parties are still suspended. Much of the new openness depends on political will rather than enforceable rights. Outdated laws still apply, and local authorities retain broad discretion. Civic space is wider in practice, but it lacks the structural safeguards needed to ensure that these gains endure.
- Syria’s civic environment is also not developing evenly across topics. Humanitarian work usually proceeds with little interference because it meets urgent needs and helps maintain stability. Political initiatives face much tighter oversight. Efforts related to reform, participation, accountability, or constitutional issues often meet higher barriers, stricter requirements, and attempts to reshape their content. In some cases, approvals are denied altogether, shutting down discussion before it begins.
- Geography further shapes civic opportunity. Safer areas, such as Damascus, allow more open engagement. Regions marked by fear, instability, or sectarian tension, including the coast, remain subdued. Local authorities differ in how they regulate civic activity: some use rigid controls, others permit informal practice, and some tighten restrictions as they consolidate power. The movement of activists across regions reinforces these contrasts, making geography a defining factor in how civic space expands or contracts.
- Openness has also shifted over time. The first months after the change in power were widely seen as a period of unusual openness, with a permissive atmosphere that allowed civic activity to flourish. As authorities reasserted control, oversight tightened, and approvals grew harder to obtain, especially for initiatives that did not fit official priorities or the roles envisioned for civic actors. Rising polarization and informal intimidation further narrowed the space, prompting self-censorship and fear. By mid-2025, growing mistrust and stricter controls pushed many activities into private or low-profile settings.
- Personalities also shape civic space. With unclear rules and overlapping mandates, outcomes often depend on individual officials. Some enforce old regulations rigidly, slowing or blocking activities, while others allow events to proceed informally. Well-connected or politically aligned organizers usually face fewer obstacles, while lesser-known groups encounter delays, cancellations, and tighter scrutiny. In this discretionary system, civic actors must decide whether to test limits or avoid them. The result is a fluid, uneven environment that leaves more critical or rights-focused groups especially exposed to unpredictable restrictions.
- Risk tolerance also shapes how civic actors navigate the transition. Those willing to test limits see legal ambiguity as an opportunity to expand space, using the moment to push boundaries. More cautious groups rely on formal procedures, over-complying when rules are unclear and steering clear of anything that might draw scrutiny. These choices often reflect differences in networks, resources, and perceived protection. The result is a mixed landscape shaped by both caution and boldness, where progress depends as much on personal risk appetite as on formal rules.
- Safeguarding and expanding civic space requires coordinated action across authorities, civic actors, and international partners. Authorities should halt enforcement of repressive laws, strengthen constitutional protections, modernize legislation governing civic life, and harmonize procedures nationwide. Civic actors should build coalitions, work with reform-minded officials, take the lead on legal reform, deepen civic education, and document violations. International partners must prioritize civic freedoms through their diplomacy, support institutional reform, offer flexible long-term funding, and integrate civic space into transition monitoring. Strengthening these foundations is essential to transform fragile openings into durable rights and prevent a slide back into controlled participation.
- Civic space cannot be treated as conditional. It requires strong legal foundations and consistent institutional support. Without these, public participation remains exposed to shifting political moods and personal discretion. Syria now faces a critical choice between returning to controlled engagement or embracing a genuinely open civic environment that supports diverse voices and democratic renewal. The decision will shape the credibility of the transition and the country’s long-term stability. Missing this moment would close off the very space Syrians need to rebuild their future on their own terms.
Introduction
The ousting of the Baath regime in December 2024 marked a pivotal moment in Syria’s political and civic trajectory, ending more than five decades of authoritarian rule. Under Assad’s rule, civic space was highly constrained. While the rights to association, expression, and assembly were legally recognized, they were systematically undermined in practice. Security agencies and bureaucratic gatekeepers controlled who could act, when, and under what conditions.((Human Rights Watch, ‘No Room to Breathe: State Repression of Human Rights Activism in Syria’, 16 October 2007, https://shorturl.at/e7rkB.)) Public life was tightly regulated and channeled through state-sanctioned avenues, while independent activism faced obstruction, intimidation, or outright repression.((Omar Hallaj and Hassan Masri, ‘Redefining Civic Boundaries: Exploring New Regulations and Challenges for NGO Registration in Post-Assad Syria’, 8 April 2025, https://www.lugarit.com/publications/publication-redefining-ngo-roles-in-post-assad-syria.))
Since the regime’s collapse, Syria has experienced a visible and wide-ranging civic opening. In cities previously under regime control – particularly Damascus – citizens have begun reclaiming public squares, organizing demonstrations, convening community forums, and forming new associations. Civil society groups have reportedly found it easier to register; public criticism of officials has resurfaced; and transitional leaders have started promoting principles such as transparency and participation – concepts largely absent during the Assad era.((Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ‘Statement of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Arab Republic H.E. Asaad Hassan al-Shibani at the 108th Session of the Executive Council (EC-108/4)’, 6 March 2025, https://www.opcw.org/sites/default/files/documents/2025/03/ec10804%28e%29.pdf.)) For the first time in decades, public space is functioning as a site for civic debate and collective action, rather than as a tool of state control.
However, this opening has unfolded unevenly and remains fragile. Although the March 2025 Constitutional Declaration affirms freedoms of association, expression, and participation, these guarantees are weakened by Article 23, which allows for broad restrictions on ambiguous grounds such as public order, morality, or national security.((Human Rights Watch, ‘Syria: Constitutional Declaration Risks Endangering Rights’, 25 March 2025, https://www.hrw.org/news/2025/03/25/syria-constitutional-declaration-risks-endangering-rights.)) Repressive legal frameworks, inherited patterns of control, and fragmented administrative authority remain in place, leaving civil society governed by a patchwork of outdated laws and improvised rules.((Omar et al, ‘Redefining Civic Boundaries’.)) The absence of new rights-based laws for both civil society groups and political parties has produced a fragile and fractured civic and political space, raising concerns about the potential emergence of repressive legal frameworks in the future.
This fluidity presents both risks and opportunities. Some civic actors, particularly those with a long history of operating in former opposition-held areas in northwest Syria, have gained greater access and cooperation from local authorities. At the same time, others remain vulnerable to arbitrary restrictions, opaque procedures, prolonged approval processes, and abrupt policy reversals. As a result, civic space varies widely across regions, sectors, and types of activity.
Multiple factors shape these variations, including the nature of the work being done, the local security environment, administrative processes, risk tolerance among civic actors, and the attitudes of local officials. These elements rarely operate in isolation. Instead, they interact in complex ways, creating a civic landscape that is dynamic, contested, and often contradictory. The uncertainty caused by this fluid environment disproportionately affects the most vulnerable civic groups – especially those whose political or human rights positions diverge from those of the transitional authorities – intensifying their concerns about the absence of legal protection.((Author interview with civil society representative, Damascus, February 2025.))
This report explores how civic space is taking shape during Syria’s transition. It examines the emerging openings across key pillars of civic life: freedom of association, peaceful assembly, expression, access to information, and participation in public affairs. The report also unpacks the complex web of factors shaping this varied civic landscape. By tracing these dynamics, it helps map the boundaries of what is possible, what is tolerated, and what remains off limits. Finally, it outlines what is needed to transform these openings into lasting, rights-based guarantees.
The analysis is based on 50 semi-structured interviews conducted in person by the author across Syria between January and November 2025. Interviewees included Syrian civil society actors, activists, analysts, and government officials. The interviewees were assured of anonymity to allow them to talk freely and mitigate the risks involved for them in sharing their experiences.
At its core, this report argues that Syria’s civic landscape is defined by both progress and fragility. Civic actors are more active and visible than at any point in recent memory, yet their ability to operate remains uneven, conditional, and easily disrupted. Without legal reform, institutional restructuring, and enforceable constitutional safeguards, the gains achieved since the regime’s collapse risk being reversed.
The stakes are critical. As Syria’s transitional authorities rewrite the rules of public life, the choices made now will shape the character of the country’s future civic and political order. If Syria’s transition is to be credible, inclusive, and lasting, civic space must not be a temporary opening or a tolerated exception – it must be protected, institutionalized, and made irreversible.