Syria’s political transition enjoyed a surprisingly smooth start until it hit major turbulence in March. On 6 March, pro-Assad armed groups launched coordinated attacks on security sites along the coast, prompting a government counteroffensive that ended in mass civilian casualties including sectarian killings against Alawites. At the same time, Israeli forces carried out their deadliest attacks on residents in Daraa and seized more territory in the country’s south, while clashes erupted along the Syrian-Lebanese border. Despite the escalating violence, the political process pushed forward. On 13 March, a Constitutional Declaration was adopted, and by 29 March, a new government was in place.
April has been calmer by comparison. A recent visit to Damascus and its surrounding areas revealed modest signs of progress: the electricity supply has improved in some districts, and traffic police and security forces are more visible, contributing to a sense of normalcy and safety. But beneath these signs of order, deep challenges remain. Economic hardship persists, and essential services are still unreliable and inadequate.
Syria’s transition was always going to be difficult, weighed down by years of war, crippling sanctions, weak institutions and a devastated economy. Yet President Ahmed al-Sharaa’s highly centralized approach – despite surface-level efforts at inclusivity – has made things harder. While a top-down strategy may have helped the new authorities move quickly and restore basic order early on, its limits are becoming clear. The transitional government lacks the capacity to govern the entire country from the center and respond effectively to local needs. This unitary approach has also failed to earn the confidence of many Syrians who remain skeptical of al-Sharaa’s administration given his history and ideology.
Still, al-Sharaa retains significant political backing, both domestically and internationally. But the challenges ahead – ranging from insecurity and economic collapse to sanctions and weak governance – cannot be solved through this centralized approach. His best chance at guiding the country toward recovery lies in empowering both the transitional government and local governance structures. These bodies must be granted real authority to respond to public concerns and start rebuilding trust from the ground up. Equally vital is the formation of a genuinely inclusive and representative legislative body. Such an institution could resolve the legal ambiguity stalling reforms and provide the legitimacy needed to move the transition forward with clarity and purpose.
Political Transition: Centralizing Power
Al-Sharaa’s public rhetoric, especially his promises of an inclusive political process, has struck a chord with many Syrians. But his first 100 days in power tell a different story. Behind the inclusive language lies a concentrated effort to centralize authority in his hands and those of his closest allies, particularly figures tied to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).
Immediately after Assad’s fall, HTS moved swiftly to entrench itself. It appointed the prime minister of its own Salvation Government – previously in charge of northwest Syria – to head the new transitional government. This caretaker authority was soon packed with HTS loyalists, who quickly assumed control over the military, security, judiciary, economy, and major state institutions. Al-Sharaa’s own appointment as interim president by HTS and allied armed groups further cemented this inner-circle dominance, giving him broad executive power while keeping key decision-making firmly within the group’s grasp.
The backlash came quickly. Critics pointed to the overwhelming presence of HTS-linked figures from former opposition territories in key positions, raising alarms about exclusion and the risk of political monopolization. Al-Sharaa responded by framing the structure that emerged immediately after the fall of Assad as temporary, aimed at preserving stability, and vowed to build a more inclusive transitional government.
While consolidating power, al-Sharaa launched a series of initiatives in support of a political transition – what many saw as token gestures meant to signal inclusion without meaningfully sharing power. The highest profile of these was the national dialogue, a process meant to set Syria’s political course. Al-Sharaa appointed a committee to organize the process, but it was quickly criticized for being dominated by figures with ideological or political ties to al-Sharaa’s own group, HTS. Also, the dialogue was viewed as rushed, held in under two weeks, leaving little time for serious debate. Some invitees were not even able to attend due to last-minute invitations, fueling concerns that the event prioritized optics over substance. His supporters, however, saw the conference as a historic milestone – the first of its kind in decades – and argued that quick action was needed to maintain momentum and move the transition forward.
The Constitution and Transitional Government
The other key process during the transitional period was the issuance of a Constitutional Declaration intended to establish the legal framework for a transitional government and legislature. A separate committee was formed to draft the document, which al-Sharaa signed following a similarly fast-tracked process. The declaration has drawn strong criticism for granting the president sweeping powers. It abolishes the role of the prime minister, centralizes executive authority in the presidency, and strips parliament of any meaningful oversight functions – effectively creating a rigid presidential system.
While the declaration nominally upholds judicial independence, it gives the president sole authority to appoint all seven members of the Higher Constitutional Court, without any external oversight. He also controls the legislature by selecting one-third of parliament members and appointing the committee that chooses the rest.
Critics argue that the five-year transitional period gives al-Sharaa ample time to consolidate power and build a loyalist deep state that could shape Syria’s political landscape for decades. Supporters, however, contend that such authority is necessary to maintain stability and manage an orderly transition.
The expiration of the caretaker government’s mandate brought renewed hope. On 29 March, a new government was announced, marking a clear shift away from the HTS-dominated cabinet. The inclusion of younger ministers and a significant number of independent technocrats and professionals was widely welcomed. However, the cabinet also drew criticism. Notably, there was a near-total absence of women – only one female minister was appointed. Observers also pointed out that all key ministries remained under HTS control and raised concerns about the questionable backgrounds of some appointees. Additionally, Kurdish political groups in the northeast and the military council in the Druze-majority Sweida rejected the new government due to their exclusion from the formation process.
Despite the criticism, conversations during my recent trip to Syria revealed a sense of cautious optimism. Many people expressed hope that the transitional government could make a difference – if its ministers are granted real authority to implement changes that improve living conditions and revive the economy.
Local Governance: A Space for More Participation
In contrast to the top-down approach to the central government, local governance – at least in the areas I visited – has followed a community-driven model. While governors are appointed by the caretaker government, local communities have been able to play a major role in selecting other local officials. This was evident during a recent visit to several areas on the outskirts of Damascus – including Jaramana, Harasta, Douma, and Daraya – as well as in the Sweida governorate. Local officials interviewed in these areas shared similar accounts of how local leadership was chosen.
In each case, influential community figures led the process of nominating candidates to head municipal and city councils. Once a local consensus was reached amongst these local notables, the proposed names were submitted to central government representatives, who then ratified the selections.
This approach not only gave communities a voice in their local governance but also relieved the newly formed caretaker authorities – who lack both capacity and local expertise – of the burden of managing these areas. More importantly, it allowed local governance structures to better mobilize financial resources from within their communities and from the diaspora. This has been critical for restoring basic services, especially given the caretaker government’s inability to allocate budgets or fund these local institutions.
Weak Service Provision
The financial struggles of Syria’s new authorities have also led to a sharp decline in essential services. Residents in former regime-held areas report that access to basic services – especially water and electricity – has deteriorated compared to the Assad era. Although electricity provision has recently improved in some places, particularly in Damascus, service quality remains far below public needs and expectations.
While the caretaker government’s failure to improve services is partly due to limited resources, sanctions, and a lack of external support, public frustration has been worsened by unmet promises. Authorities had pledged sweeping improvements, including a 400% salary increase and rapid solutions to electricity shortages – none of which materialized.
Another major source of public anger has been the mass dismissal of tens of thousands of public sector employees, many of whom were left without jobs or financial support. The restructuring of government institutions has disrupted essential bureaucratic functions, making daily life more difficult. Shortages of staff, funding, and administrative capacity continue to undermine the effectiveness of state institutions – especially at the local level – fueling widespread dissatisfaction with the new leadership.
Economic and Living Conditions
While the caretaker government achieved some early economic gains, its overall performance has come under heavy criticism. Following Assad’s ouster, authorities eased import restrictions and lowered customs fees, making foreign goods more accessible and affordable. Chronic fuel shortages also eased, with gas and diesel becoming more widely available. Although prices remained higher than the old subsidized rates, they were still lower than black market levels, which had long been the primary source of supply. These changes, along with a brief improvement in the value of the Syrian lira, temporarily increased purchasing power and made basic goods more affordable.
However, the situation quickly deteriorated. A key issue was the caretaker government’s failure to stabilize the lira, which fluctuated sharply in mid-February – dropping more than 30% in a matter of days from 12,000 to around 7,500 per dollar This volatility created economic uncertainty, disrupted markets, and deterred investment.
At the center of the crisis is a severe liquidity shortage, worsened by restrictive Central Bank policies. Until recently, individuals could withdraw only 200,000 lira per day (around $20), and only a few times per month. These restrictions also applied to businesses and charities, severely limiting their operations. Combined with delayed salary payments and the mass dismissal of tens of thousands of workers, these policies forced many Syrians to rely on savings or take on debt.
In response to public pressure, the weekly withdrawal limit was eventually raised to 500,000 lira (roughly $50), and more recently to 1.8 million lira (about $180). The black market exchange rate has also stabilized at around 10,000 per dollar, still well below the official rate of 13,200. While these steps have provided limited relief, broader economic challenges remain severe. Although the financial collapse inherited from Assad’s regime is a major factor, many Syrians place the blame on the caretaker government’s restrictive withdrawal policies. The lack of transparency around these measures has fueled speculation that the authorities are deliberately limiting liquidity to stabilize the lira.
While Syrian monetary policy may have contributed to limited access to deposits, international sanctions remain the single biggest factor in the country’s deteriorating economic condition during the transition. Al-Sharaa’s efforts to re-engage with the West have earned him goodwill from many regional and international actors. Several countries have resumed diplomatic ties with Damascus, and both the EU and the U.S. have eased some of their sanctions through temporary measures or exemptions. However, the limited duration of U.S. sanctions exemptions and concerns about potential future legal implications have made governments and businesses reluctant to offer substantial support or invest in Syria.
Negotiations to lift additional sanctions are ongoing, but progress depends on al-Sharaa’s willingness to address U.S. and EU concerns. These include dismantling remaining chemical weapons stockpiles, combating terrorism, ensuring inclusive governance, and protecting minority rights. While al-Sharaa has shown some willingness to cooperate on certain issues, others are viewed by his government as infringements on Syrian sovereignty and too high a price for the limited concessions offered in return.
One major sticking point is the status of foreign fighters who supported al-Sharaa in the battle against Assad. He views them as allies who deserve recognition and protection. In contrast, the U.S. and others see these fighters as a threat due to their radical ideologies and hostility toward Western nations. Finding common ground on this issue will be crucial to resolving international concerns and unlocking the broader lifting of sanctions on Syria.
Security Situation
Like the economy, Syria’s security situation was initially relatively stable but has since deteriorated. The low level of violence during Assad’s ouster helped avoid widespread conflict, with the exception of areas in the northeast. The discipline shown by military and security forces in the weeks following the transition also played a key role in limiting violations and preventing revenge killings.
Interim President al-Sharaa quickly convinced most armed factions to merge under the Ministry of Defense. More recently, he reached similar preliminary agreements with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces and Druze factions – both of which had stayed out of the original unification deal.
However, since late December, hit-and-run attacks against government forces have increased, particularly in the coastal region. In response, government forces and affiliated militias have committed revenge killings and human rights violations, especially in central and coastal areas. Crime, including kidnappings and theft, has also risen. This instability stems from several factors: the dismantling of former regime-affiliated security forces, the limited capacity of the caretaker’s forces to secure former regime-held areas, and worsening economic conditions.
Another major trigger is the absence of accountability for the former regime. No officials have been tried, no transitional justice process has begun, and no compensation mechanisms have been announced. The vast majority of internally displaced people have been unable to return to their homes due to destruction and a lack of services and livelihood opportunities. Meanwhile, hundreds of regime officers remain untouched in their homes.
The most serious security challenge so far came from coordinated attacks in Latakia that killed over 13 security personnel. While the rebellion was swiftly crushed, mass human rights violations were committed by some government forces during the operation. Videos circulating on social media depict excessive force, field executions, and mass killings motivated by revenge and sectarian tensions, particularly in Latakia and Tartous. So far, the Syrian Network for Human Rights has documented the killing of at least 803 people in Latakia, Hama, Tartous, and Homs between 6 March and 10 March. The casualties included 172 government forces and 211 civilians killed by pro-Assad forces, alongside at least 420 civilians and “disarmed militants” killed by armed forces aligned with Damascus.
This highlighted weaknesses in the caretaker government’s ability to respond proportionately and raised questions about the discipline of its affiliated forces. Nonetheless, al-Sharaa has responded promisingly so far. He acknowledged the violations and established a committee to investigate and hold perpetrators accountable. But whether this leads to meaningful action remains to be seen, which will shape both public trust and the new administration’s international standing. So far, Western engagement with al-Sharaa’s government has been cautiously positive, with initial signals of acceptance and phased sanctions relief. But failure to address recent violations by groups affiliated with Syria’s new authorities could stall or reverse this progress.
In recent weeks, the caretaker government has increased security deployments to tackle rising crime, but building a unified, disciplined force remains a major challenge. Many armed factions still operate under their original command structures and receive funding from sources outside the Ministry of Defense. Training is minimal, and mechanisms to ensure accountability are weak – as shown by recent events in the coastal region.
The disbanding of Ahmad Al-Awda’s Eighth Brigade on 13 April marks a significant shift in Syria’s security landscape. It removed al-Sharaa’s most prominent rival in the south and opened the door for Damascus to tighten its control over Daraa. Some observers have linked the brigade’s dissolution to al-Sharaa’s recent visit to the UAE, a country known for its ties to Al-Awda. While regional dynamics may have helped facilitate the move, it was likely al-Sharaa’s on-the-ground strategy that proved decisive.
He appeared to follow a familiar playbook: fostering rival power centers, systematically isolating and weakening the brigade, then applying pressure at the right moment – combining the threat of force with community-led pressure. These efforts culminated in a negotiated deal that led to the brigade’s largely bloodless dismantling, a method reminiscent of tactics previously used to neutralize HTS rivals in northwest Syria.
The dismantling of the Eighth Brigade suggests this model could be replicated elsewhere to disband other armed factions. However, while this strategy might succeed in extending nominal state control, it does little to address the deeper structural problems undermining the transition. The grievances raised by reluctant factions – demands for decentralization, rejection of HTS’s dominance, and calls for genuine power-sharing – cannot be resolved through coercion alone.
Creating a professional, cohesive, and disciplined security force will take time and resources – both of which the new authorities have lacked over the past three months. Still, given the scale of the challenge and the risks of inaction, progress on this front is urgent and cannot be delayed.
Delivering on the Mandate
Despite recent signs of progress, Syria remains fragile and deeply uncertain. As a new government begins its mandate and the transition enters a new phase, this is a critical moment for al-Sharaa and his administration. Syria’s future will not be shaped by declarations or optics, but by whether the new government delivers meaningful, inclusive, and lasting reforms across all sectors.
To move forward, the political transition must go beyond symbolic gestures and move toward genuine inclusion. Al-Sharaa’s best chance of steering the country toward recovery lies in empowering both the transitional government and local governance structures.
He needs to follow through on his pledge of broad-based representation and participation. While the appointment of technocrats is a positive step, deeper reforms are essential. Ministers must be given the authority, independence, and resources to implement real change. Additionally, the transitional government should revisit the early decisions of the first post-Assad government – particularly the mass dismissal of civil servants that has left thousands jobless and unsupported. Transparent governance and participatory policymaking are critical if public trust is to be restored.
Equally important is the creation of a truly inclusive and representative legislative body. Such an institution could help resolve the legal ambiguities currently stalling reform efforts and provide the legitimacy needed to move the transition forward with clarity and purpose.
The constitutional framework also requires revision. The current declaration grants the presidency sweeping powers and lacks sufficient checks and balances. Both the Self-Administration in the northeast and the Druze community in Sweida – areas still outside Damascus’s control – have rejected the declaration. Amending it could provide the guarantees these groups need to lay down their arms and rejoin the national political process.
Although al-Sharaa is reluctant to amend the Constitutional Declaration, he may come to see it as the only viable path to national unity. Notably, the declaration itself allows the legislative body to amend its articles, meaning reforms could be made without rewriting the document from scratch.
On the economic front, urgent action is needed. The government must stabilize the currency, ease liquidity restrictions, and improve the delivery of essential services. While international sanctions and the financial collapse inherited from Assad’s regime pose real constraints, the government cannot wait for external solutions. It must begin making tangible improvements to daily life – starting with electricity and water.
Security remains the most urgent and volatile challenge facing Syria. The surge in violence, lawlessness, and human rights violations reflects not only a lack of capacity and manpower but also the failure to establish a unified command structure and enforce accountability. Building a professional, disciplined, and inclusive security force is essential. This means dismantling competing armed factions, ending impunity, ensuring civilian oversight, and launching a credible transitional justice process to address past atrocities and enable national reconciliation.
However, these efforts will only succeed if the concerns of local armed groups – particularly in northeast Syria and Sweida – are addressed. Their demands around inclusion, the chosen model of governance, and the future nature of the Syrian state must be taken seriously. Without credible guarantees, these groups are unlikely to disarm, as they continue to view their weapons as their only means of protection.
Ultimately, the success of the transition hinges on whether Syrians see real, tangible improvements in their daily lives. Without progress on the ground, frustration will grow, divisions will deepen, and the risk of renewed unrest will rise.
Yet it must be acknowledged that al-Sharaa cannot deliver this change alone. Regional and international support will be vital to giving Syria a fair shot at recovery. Sanctions relief, targeted non-humanitarian aid (to support capacity building in security governance, economic management, and financial policy), and reconstruction support are all critical to helping the country stabilize and rebuild.
Syria now stands at a crossroads. The opportunity to lay the foundation for a new, more just and inclusive state exists, but time is short, expectations are high, and the cost of failure is immense. The choices made in the coming weeks and months will determine not only Syria’s trajectory but also the stability of the entire Levant region.